

## **Chapter 4**

### **ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA**

#### **I. Introduction and Evaluation of Witness Statements**

##### **A. Introduction**

During the Review, both the U.S. and ROK Teams asked witnesses to recall events that occurred 50 years ago in the last week of July 1950. After obtaining the statements, the reliability of the witnesses' memory as reflected in the witnesses' statements was assessed. The U.S. Team's assessment was that statements of both the Korean and American witnesses, taken by themselves, contained limited information that was clear enough to allow the Team to develop detailed findings of fact or draw firm conclusions. The U.S. Review Team concluded that some of the events as described in the witness statements could have taken place but not necessarily on the dates, in the sequence, or at the locations the witnesses stated. The reviews of witness statements included in this chapter identify areas of consensus between statements and outline possible sequences of events.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed veterans from a wide variety of organizations and backgrounds. Interviewees included mostly enlisted men, but some officers from companies, battalions and regiments across Divisions and Corps headquarters were interviewed. The interviewers also took statements from United States Air Force veterans, primarily pilots, and civilian reporters.

Recognizing the fallibility of human memory after the passage of 50 years, the U.S. Review Team treated witness statements as evidence to be integrated with all other available information. The press accounts of events at No Gun Ri, to include the first Associated Press accounts mentioned in Chapter 1, treated witness statements as authoritative.

In December 1999, at the beginning of the interview portion of the review process, the U.S. and ROK Teams agreed that each respective Team would interview that Team's own witnesses and then share the witness statements. The U.S. Review Team did not interview any Korean witnesses or observe the conduct of the Korean interviews.

The quality and the content of the Korean statements concerned the U.S. Review Team given the very serious nature of the allegations. Since these statements are translations from Korean into English, some meaning may have been lost. However, in the translated statements, Korean witnesses described events using precise times, dates, and military terms such as "reconnaissance plane" and "artillery." Since the Korean witnesses were farmers and children from rural villages in South Korea, it is unclear to the U.S. Review Team how the

Koreans acquired this specialized knowledge. In some Korean statements, the witness was asked in a lengthy question if a summarized account of another witness was correct. It is also sometimes difficult to tell in the text of the translated statements if a witness is restating hearsay. Statements that include responses to direct questions in an active-voice response (for example, "I saw..." and so on) reduce the possibility that the witness is restating hearsay. Nevertheless, the U.S. Review Team reviewed and analyzed the statements of 49 of 76 Korean witnesses. Only 49 witness statements were analyzed because the remaining statements did not contain sufficient information to permit close scrutiny and analysis.

Each Team sent the other Team copies of the witness statements and the other Team arranged for translation of the statements. Almost 200 U.S. witness interviews were transcribed verbatim in a question-and-answer format by certified court reporters. Copies of these transcripts were given to the ROK Team. Korean witness statements were not provided in uniform formats.<sup>1</sup>

When possible, U.S. interviewers attempted to clarify conflicting or ambiguous responses in U.S. interviews with additional questions or re-interviews. The U.S. Review Team did not have the same opportunity with the Korean witnesses. However, in December 1999, the U.S. Review Team asked the ROK Review Team to ask the Korean witnesses 45 questions. The response to U.S. request provided by the ROK Review Team was a series of short-answer or one-word responses to the questions from 20 witnesses.

In February 2000, the U.S. Team was notified that a law firm represented the "victims and survivors of No Gun RI." The U.S. Review Team contacted the law firm on February 22, 2000, and stated that the Review Team would consider any relevant information they wished to provide from their clients. The U.S. Review Team received no information from the law firm.

## **B. Evaluation of Witness Statements**

Witness statements are based on their memories. The memory process has three stages: acquisition of memory (something happens), retention of the memory (storage) and retrieval of the memory (recall).<sup>2</sup> All fact-finding requires an assessment of the accuracy or reliability of the witnesses' ability to remember events. Could the person giving the statement have seen, heard, and done what he or she is describing in the way he or she describes it?

Memory is influenced by many factors, including, but not limited to, violence; stress; age at the time of the event and at the time of recall; illness, to include psychiatric and physical illnesses;<sup>3</sup> passage of time since the event; contamination; bias; and the interview process itself.<sup>4</sup>

Contamination of memory affected all witnesses.<sup>5</sup> Veterans read histories,<sup>6</sup> magazines and newspaper articles,<sup>7</sup> watched television programs,<sup>8</sup> spoke to and corresponded with each other, and attended reunions.<sup>9</sup> Korean witnesses discussed events with older family members, other victims and officials<sup>10</sup>; met with U.S. Veterans<sup>11</sup>; read books, magazines, and newspaper articles<sup>12</sup>; participated in group meetings<sup>13</sup>; and watched television programs.<sup>14</sup> One veteran, when he was asked if he had seen something in Korea, actually stated to his interviewer that: "I'm hoping that I am not confusing something I have seen on television."<sup>15</sup>

A good example of distortion and contamination of memory concerns Mr. Edward Daily, one of the veterans interviewed by the Associated Press in September 1999. The AP identified Mr. Daily as a machine gunner with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. In his AP interview, he described being haunted by the memories of the shootings of refugees at No Gun Ri. According to available military records, Mr. Edward Daily was a member of 27th Ordnance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, from March 18, 1949, to March 16, 1951, and not H Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. Mr. Daily attended reunions and spoke to other veterans about serving in Korea with them. The veterans believed he had served with them based on his behavior.<sup>16</sup> In meetings in September 2000 in Washington, D.C., members of the ROK Review Team stated that Korean witnesses still believe that Mr. Daily was at No Gun Ri. Some Korean witnesses met with Mr. Daily in South Korea. Mr. Daily's conversations with Korean and American witnesses contaminated their memories.

Under optimal conditions, the ability to remember dates, distances, quantities, geography, locations and the names of people and places varies from one individual to another. In addition to an individual's normal memory gaps, individual memories can be distorted or biased.<sup>17</sup> The distortions and biases in their memory may result from exaggeration, exposure to other accounts of the events, stress, and age.<sup>18</sup> Systematic exaggeration, also known as harmless "war stories" that embellish the contribution that some veterans made to the war effort, could have affected the accuracy of the veteran's statements. Interactions with interviewers and the questioning technique can introduce distortions into a statement.<sup>19</sup> The subject of the interview may want to help the interviewer or may not want to provide answers that reflect unfavorably upon him or her.<sup>20</sup>

Age affected the memory of all witnesses, both Korean and American. The age of the witnesses at the time of the incident affects that person's ability to remember the incident fully.<sup>21</sup> The U.S. veterans were approximately 18 - 39 years old at the time of the events. Approximately 19 Korean witnesses<sup>22</sup> were the same age as the veterans at the time of the events. Although these witnesses may have understood and remembered events at the time they happened, some of their memories 50 years later are now likely to be affected by age-associated memory impairment. Over half of the Korean witnesses were under 16 years of age at the time of the incidents. Childhood memories can fade

over time. A child less than 10 years old cannot recall exact sequences of events, times, and places as well as an adult's ability to do so.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, although people remember events in their childhood, these memories are subject to distortion and bias over time. The Korean witnesses who were children during the war may not have understood what was happening. Their statements contain comments that suggest that they did not understand war or weaponry.

Finally, another criterion used to evaluate witness statements was physical impossibility. Could the witness have seen or heard what he or she described given the terrain, human physical abilities, and the effectiveness of certain weapons? Could a witness have done what he or she described doing? Was it physically possible?

The U.S. Team's internal evaluation of witness statements considered all witness statements; the opinions of experts; and used the skills of all personnel assigned to the U.S. Team, to include a military historian, attorney, Korean linguist, and interviewers on the U.S. Team. The U.S. Review Team consulted photographs, maps, a terrain model, and computer imagery of the No Gun Ri vicinity. The next two sections of this chapter are the reviews of the witness statements.

## **II. U.S. ARMY AND U.S. AIR FORCE VETERANS REVIEW**

### **A. Purpose**

The purpose of this section is to outline the U.S. interview process<sup>24</sup> and review and summarize veterans' testimony. Official written records and the witness statements are inconsistent; however, the purpose of this section is not to reconcile these inconsistencies but to review and summarize the witness statements.

### **B. The Interview Process**

The U.S. Review Team gathered the names of veterans who might have information about the alleged incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Names of potential interviewees came from eight sources:

1. The National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO.
2. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Washington, DC.
3. The Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), Washington, DC.
4. The National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II), College Park, MD.
5. The Inspector General No Gun Ri Review web site, toll free voice and fax lines, and letters from concerned citizens.
6. Veterans Service Organizations (VSO).
7. Korean War-related web sites.

## 8. Media accounts.

### **C. Contact Lists**

From an initial list of over 7,375 names, the U.S. Review Team developed a contact list of 3,213 names. The U.S. Review Team crosschecked all names identified on the contact list against official record sources to authenticate the list. Neither official data sources (National Personnel Records Center, Defense Manpower Data Center, Department of Veteran's Affairs, and the National Archives and Records Center Administration II) nor the media accounts gave current addresses and telephone numbers for potential interview subjects.

The U.S. interviewers relied on the Internet for information on potential interview subjects that was not available in official sources. Few of the official veteran information data sources from which the U.S. Review Team took most of its leads, as well as leads from media accounts, gave current locator information. Addresses and telephone numbers of individuals were obtained using official records and Internet searches. The names of those identified as deceased, as well as those who could not be located due to insufficient information such as incomplete names, were deleted from the list of potential interview subjects. If the U.S. interviewers could not contact a veteran by telephone who was listed by the 7th Cavalry Korean War Veterans Association, the U.S. Review Team sent a registered letter asking the veteran to contact the U.S. Review Team. In addition, the U.S. Review Team sent registered letters to veterans from the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments asking them to contact the U.S. Review Team.

Air Force veterans' interviews were treated as a separate subset when developing the contact list and during the interview process. Air Force and Army researchers located Fifth Air Force personnel rosters containing names of American pilots assigned to Japan and Korea during the June-July 1950 timeframe. The U.S. Review Team created a contact list of a representative cross-section of pilots from the three F-80 fighter-bomber squadrons, the T-6-equipped 6147<sup>th</sup> Tactical Air Control Squadron, members of the Headquarters Staff of Fifth Air Force, and one officer from a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Individuals who contacted the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) hotline were screened and added to the contact list if they offered information pertinent to this review. Air Force veterans previously interviewed by the news media were also included on the list as well as those individuals referred by other veterans during personal interviews.

All U.S. interviewers received advice and training in interview techniques; interview structure; gender-based differences in interviews; setting and uniform; and the use of visual aids. Before interview questions were constructed and interviews conducted, a psychiatrist from Walter Reed Medical Center briefed members of the U.S. Review Team on conducting interviews with traumatized witnesses. The psychiatrist also addressed potential problems of interviewing

aged veterans concerning the complex issues involved with recalling events that occurred over 50 years ago.

#### **D. Interview Categories**

The U.S. Army veterans fell into three broad categories:

Category 1: Individuals identified from the sources listed above who were in the vicinity of No Gun Ri area or who were in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, at the time of the alleged No Gun Ri incident.

Category 2: Individuals with second-hand knowledge. This category includes individuals that were not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri area but who received information about the alleged No Gun Ri incident from individuals who may have been in the area at the time of the alleged incident.

Category 3: Those individuals who were in other units or locations other than No Gun Ri, but who could provide background or contextual information.

U.S. Air Force veterans were also divided into three categories.

Category 1: Individuals with direct, first-hand knowledge of policies, procedures, and the situation during July 1950 and who may have taken part in air strikes in the last week of July 1950.

Category 2: Individuals with direct, first-hand knowledge of the policies, procedures, and the situation in July 1950.

Category 3: Individuals with indirect knowledge of policies, procedures, and the situation during the late-July 1950 period.

Organization charts depicting the persons interviewed and their unit of assignment at the time of the incident are at the end of this chapter.

#### **E. Interview Schedules**

Category 1 interviews for Army and Air Force Veterans began on February 28, 2000. Interviews of individuals in Category 2 and 3 began on December 29, 1999. Prior to completing the interviews, the interviewees were asked if they knew of other individuals whom the U.S. Review Team could contact who might have information concerning the No Gun Ri incident. Veterans who were referred by interviewees in Category 1 were placed in the same category. The referrals remained in Category 1 even if the subsequent interview revealed that the information they offered placed them in another category or indicated that they had arrived in Korea after July 1950.

The U.S. Review Team scheduled face-to-face interviews with veterans if an initial screening or a telephonic interview indicated that they had direct knowledge about the No Gun Ri allegations. Face-to-face interviews of selected veterans occurred both in Washington, DC, and at the veteran's residence, depending on whether the veteran was able to travel. As part of the interview process, the U.S. Review Team used a variety of graphic aids, to include period maps, a three-dimensional terrain model, and computer-based digital imagery of the No Gun Ri area. These tools allowed the veteran to place himself "on the ground" where he thought he was located and to view the terrain from this position. After screening the contact list of over 3,000 names, approximately 200 veterans were interviewed and some veterans were re-interviewed. Approximately 3,046 identified veterans either had no information or had unlisted telephone numbers. Eleven veterans contacted by the U.S. Review Team declined to be interviewed.

## **F. Interview Results**

Official records were used to establish place names, unit locations, and dates. When veterans were interviewed, dates, unit locations, and place names were used in questions. Almost all of the interviewees had a difficult time remembering specific dates, locations, and events. The early weeks of the Korean War were chaotic, with units rarely staying in any one location longer than a matter of days. Most soldiers did not have maps in the beginning weeks of the conflict because maps were in short supply. Furthermore, many veterans interviewed were not in a position of responsibility that required them to determine their location at any given time.

No two interviewees remembered the exact same sequence of events. However, there was consistency among most interviewees on three major points. First, none of the veterans recalled seeing "hundreds" of dead refugees in the double railway overpass as stated by the South Korean witnesses. Second, all veterans interviewed said that the use of deadly force was never authorized against civilians who posed no threat to the unit. However, most veterans felt that if the unit received fire from individuals in civilian clothes, they could use deadly force to defend themselves. Third, most Army veterans indicated that they were warned of incidents in which North Korean soldiers dressed as civilians and intermingled with civilians to infiltrate U.S. lines and ambush U.S. forces from the rear. Likewise, the soldiers received instructions to be wary of groups of individuals dressed in civilian clothes. A few soldiers did not receive these warnings.<sup>25</sup>

Several interviewees claim that U.S. soldiers directed small arms fire toward or over the heads of a group of unidentified individuals in civilian clothing to prevent them from coming into U.S. lines.<sup>26</sup> Several veterans stated that they received or observed small-arms fire from the direction of groups of individuals in civilian attire and that U.S. soldiers returned that fire.<sup>27</sup> With the exception of Mr.

Edward Daily, none of the veterans interviewed by the U.S. Review Team stated that they ever received orders to shoot and kill Korean civilians at the double railroad overpass near No Gun Ri.

Of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment veterans interviewed, only three recalled displacing South Koreans from unknown villages.<sup>28</sup> However, seven members of the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment indicated that they evacuated or escorted Korean civilians from their villages in late July and early August 1950. On July 25, 1950, the date the Korean witnesses state they were evacuated, the 5th Cavalry Regiment was in Yongdong, approximately five miles from Im Gae Ri. The soldiers who said they evacuated civilians did so based on instructions from their units' chain of command. The primary reasons cited were to improve local security and to remove the non-combatants from the combat zone for their own protection. All stated that they never used deadly force while evacuating civilians. Most soldiers believed that the Koreans returned to their villages as soon as the U.S. units moved out of the area. One of the veterans interviewed said that he escorted a large number of Koreans (approximately 300) from their village toward the rear area where they were turned over to another U.S. military unit with Korean translators.<sup>29</sup>

Throughout the United States Air Force (USAF) veteran interview process, several recurring themes pertaining to the situation in the early weeks of the Korean War came to light. The majority of the USAF veterans interviewed were under the impression that North Korean People's Army (NKPA) soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups; several pilots even visually observed the infiltration taking place.<sup>30</sup> None of the USAF veterans interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of anyone participating in, the deliberate strafing of civilians.<sup>31</sup> All pilots interviewed stated that they neither received nor heard about any orders to strafe civilians. They vividly recall stern verbal policies implemented to prevent attacks on non-combatants. A couple of the pilots interviewed recognized the place name Yongdong. Several pilots flew missions on July 26, 1950. However, none of these men could recall any mission resembling the alleged events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.<sup>32</sup>

The term "refugees" was used in the interviews and in this section of Chapter 4 to describe all individuals dressed in civilian attire moving on roads and railways whether they were Korean civilians, North Korean soldiers dressed in civilian attire, or civilians carrying arms or supplies in support of the North Koreans. Where interviewees could distinguish between civilian non-combatants or civilian-clad North Korean infiltrators, their ability to identify infiltrators is noted in this section of Chapter 4.

## **G. Analysis of Media Account Interviews**

In the Associated Press (AP) accounts in September 1999 about the incident at No Gun Ri, Edward Daily is the only U.S. veteran who states that he



received orders from the chain of command (relayed by a runner) to shoot refugees intentionally without regard to their non-combatant status. In a *NBC Dateline* interview on December 29, 1999, Edward Daily repeated his account of what happened at No Gun Ri. The U.S. Review Team interviewed Edward Daily later.<sup>33</sup> Mr. Daily provided a detailed description of events at No Gun Ri. Military records were also reviewed, including rosters and morning reports. The records indicated that Mr. Daily was a member of the 27<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, from March 18, 1949, to March 16, 1951, and not H Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment. His unit was not in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on the dates the killings are alleged to have happened. Further, with the exception of one noncommissioned officer, who recalled seeing Mr. Daily in March / April 1951 after he was assigned to H Company, no other veteran interviewed can remember physically meeting Mr. Daily while in Korea.<sup>34</sup>

In follow-up interviews by the media and the U.S. Team, Mr. Daily could not explain the discrepancies between the records and his memories. This Review relied on the accounts of witnesses whose testimony was supported by records indicating that they were members of units present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950. Because the U.S. Review Team could not place Mr. Daily in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, his account of what occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri was not used in this Review. However, because Mr. Daily spoke to many veterans, granted widely quoted interviews in the media, and met with Korean witnesses, the U.S. Review Team considered the impact that he could and did have on their recollection of events.

Two other veterans, Mr. Delos Flint and Mr. Eugene Hesselman, also spoke to the AP concerning their involvement in the alleged incident. Mr. Flint stated that he was caught with other soldiers and refugees in a strafing attack, and they then took cover in a culvert. Some time after taking cover in the culvert, he stated that they received fire in the culvert and that fire may have come from his fellow soldiers. Mr. Hesselman mentioned in the AP account that his Company Commander at the time, Captain Melbourne C. Chandler said: "The hell with all those people. Let's get rid of all of them." Mr. Hesselman also stated that an occasional shot could be heard originating from the underpasses. Once the shooting subsided, Hesselman stated that soldiers searched the underpasses and someone produced a sub-machine gun.

The U.S. Review Team contacted both men. Mr. Flint declined an interview. Mr. Hesselman, when initially contacted, stated he did not want to be interviewed at that time. Despite repeated attempts by the U.S. Review Team to contact Mr. Hesselman both telephonically and in writing, he did not contact the U.S. Team. An examination of morning reports and the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment War Diary in the National Archives indicated that Mr. Flint was wounded on July 25, 1950, and evacuated no later than July 26, 1950, and that Mr. Hesselman was wounded and evacuated no later than July 27, 1950. It is likely that Mr. Hesselman and / or Mr. Flint were not present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri at the

time of the alleged incident. No other veterans interviewed can confirm the presence of either individual in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Since the U.S. Review Team could not interview either man, the U.S. Review Team cannot explain or resolve the contradiction between the published accounts of the incident by Mr. Flint and Mr. Hesselman, with their probable absence from the area as indicated by military records and other interviews.

Mr. Norman Tinkler told reporters that he shot refugees at No Gun Ri. In the AP article released in September 1999, he is quoted as saying: "We just annihilated them." He also said, "War is not just comprehended, but it has to be done. And it's the individual that has to make the decision." In *U.S. News & World Report* ([www.usnews.com](http://www.usnews.com)), dated May 12, 2000, he is quoted as saying: "Refugees came through our positions the day before and pulled pins and threw three hand grenades at our guys. I wasn't going to let them get near me. I was on a .30-caliber Browning water-cooled machine gun that fires 700 rounds a minute. I was located on the right side of the railroad tracks facing the bridge, between a quarter and a half-mile away. And yes, I fired at them. Nobody gave me orders. Nobody was there to give me any orders. There was just me and one other guy on this gun. Nobody else around. I saw maybe 150 refugees go in that bridge tunnel. I fired one belt, 250 rounds. I could see maybe a couple feet of one edge of the tunnel and I aimed at that and moved the elevation knob up and down, ricocheting bullets into the tunnel." On July 23, 2000, *The Wichita Eagle* featured an interview with Norman Tinkler in which Tinkler claimed to have "looked down the barrel of his tripod-mounted machine gun toward a throng of Korean women and children -- perhaps a hundred of them -- a thousand yards away. For a minute or two, he pulled the trigger, firing hundreds of rounds." According to that press account, "Tinkler defended his actions, saying he shot because he thought enemy troops were hiding among the refugees, waiting to ambush."

Members of the U.S. Review Team contacted Mr. Tinkler on several occasions, but he refused to be interviewed. The U.S. Team's research indicates that Mr. Tinkler was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment, in July 1950. Mr. Tinkler's account of the number of refugees and the fact that he does not recall any specific orders given to shoot refugees is consistent with other veterans' statements. However, without an interview of Mr. Tinkler, a more detailed account is not possible. Based on all information examined by the U.S. Review Team and a terrain analysis of the No Gun Ri area, which factored in the distance and angles Mr. Tinkler stated he fired from at No Gun Ri, the U.S. Review Team concluded that this firing, combined with other firing described by U.S. witnesses, could not have caused the "hundreds" of casualties alleged by the South Korean witnesses.

The AP article reported that Colonel (Retired) Robert M. Carroll, then a 25-year-old first lieutenant, remembered battalion riflemen opening fire on the refugees from their foxholes. The AP article stated, " 'This is right after we get

orders that nobody comes through, civilian, military, nobody,' said Carroll, of Lansdowne, Va." The AP also quoted Carroll as saying, "There weren't any North Koreans in there the first day, I'll tell you that. It was mainly women and kids and old men." To the AP, Carroll further recalled that he then left the area and knew nothing about what followed.

When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Colonel Carroll said that: "He remembered elements from one of the line companies firing their weapons at a group of about 50 Korean refugees on a railroad track, many were women and children dressed in white over garments." The refugees reacted to the firing by huddling in a group. They did not appear to be a threat so he stopped the unit from firing at them. He stated that none of the refugees had been shot. In his comments to the U.S. Team, Colonel Carroll indicated that the AP used only a few quotations from their interview with him, which lasted approximately three hours.

The AP also interviewed Colonel (Retired) Herbert Heyer, who was the battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, in late July 1950. The AP article stated that: "Heyer, of Sandy Springs, Ga., [who] denied knowing anything about the shootings and said, 'I know I didn't give such an order.' " The article also quoted other veterans as saying the colonel apparently was leaving the battalion's operations to his subordinates at the time.

When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Heyer said, "I know that there's a lot more information but I just don't have the information to give you, because I don't know. I can't remember. Now, one thing it has been fifty years ago and a lot has happened during that fifty years. Of course it suddenly surfaced with this Associated Press interview. That's the first I've heard since then."

The Associated Press also reported that: "One battalion lieutenant located by the AP said he was in the area but knew nothing about the killing of civilians. 'I have honestly never, ever heard of this from either my soldiers or superiors or my friends' said John C. Lippincott of Stone Mountain, Ga. He said he could have missed it because 'we were extremely spread out.' "

When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Colonel (Retired) Lippincott said: "Because honestly before this -- this occurred and I read all the events I would have sworn to you it never happened, because I was right there all the time. I never heard a word of it mentioned till I saw it in the paper. And I want you to know that as long as I was there I had never received an order as a Platoon Leader that -- to kill all civilian refugees coming through the lines because some 'em may be North Korean Soldiers. Now, we did receive word and warning, and warnings and admonishments that the North Koreans are trying to infiltrate our lines and they're dressed like refugees. So they may be among the refugees. You gotta be extremely, extremely careful. Well, I imagine a soldier could interpret that many ways. You know, by saying well if that occurs we don't let

any of 'em through. But those were the kind of warnings and admonishments we received. Never -- I was never told to kill all civilians that attempted to come through the lines."

The AP article also stated "the Koreans said the Americans may have been seeing their own comrades' fire, ricocheting through from the tunnels' opposite ends. 'That's possible', said Preece. 'It could actually have happened, that they were seeing our own fire, ...We were scared to death'," said Preece, a career soldier who later fought in Vietnam.

When interviewed by the U.S. Team, Sergeant First Class (Retired) George Preece said, "I've got a feeling it was a blast. A muzzle blast coming out of that tunnel. Again, now, it could have been. I'm not putting that out of possibility, but I don't see how. I mean it could have been. I mean ricochets from this guy shooting from this tunnel. I've had that told to me before too, but it's -- I don't believe that." He also said: "I saw flashes coming out from under the bridge and you saw where the shells were hitting. And it's close to that machine-gun over there. You could see where it was hitting the dust, hitting the rocks, and things...And when they [soldiers] shot into it, there wasn't that many rounds shot into it."

Other veterans also present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri say they were misquoted in the original AP account. Mr. Herman Patterson was quoted in the AP report as saying that: "It was just a wholesale slaughter." In his statement to the U.S. Team, he said the AP misquoted him and that this quotation referred to his unit at the Naktong when they were overrun.<sup>35</sup> He said he told the AP (September 29, 1999) that: "It was a damn near massacre of us." Mr. James Kerns is quoted as saying that "he, Preece and another GI found at least seven dead North Korean soldiers in the underpasses, wearing uniforms under peasant white." In his statement to the U.S. Team, Mr. Kerns said he never said such a thing.<sup>36</sup> He told the U.S. Review Team that he saw between four and nine bodies laying down in the culverts but was not sure if they were dead.<sup>37</sup> Mr. Kerns said he only told the AP that he saw some grenades and a burp gun in the tunnel.

The AP article stated "[that] others recalled only heavy barrages of American firepower, not hostile fire." This comment was followed by a quotation from Mr. Louis Allen, who said, "I don't remember shooting coming out." The implication here is that veterans remembered Americans firing into the (No Gun Ri) tunnel but not refugees firing from the tunnel. However, when the U.S. Review Team interviewed Mr. Allen, he stated that he was on re-enlistment leave when the 7th Cavalry Regiment deployed to Korea and that he did not link up with his unit, F Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, until August 1950 in the vicinity of Taegu.<sup>38</sup>

In its September 29, 1999, article regarding No Gun Ri, the AP reported that: "At 1st Cavalry Headquarters, division commander Major General Hobart R.

Gay was told South Korean refugees were killed by North Korean troops in a crossfire at No Gun Ri, the division information officer recalled. 'I think that's what he believed,' said Harold D. Steward, an ex-colonel from San Diego." Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Steward told the U.S. Review Team that he was misquoted; what he said was there were confirmed reports of civilians killed in crossfire throughout the Eighth Army sector. He did not specify areas where these incidents might have taken place. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Steward stated that he never said that civilians were killed at No Gun Ri in a crossfire.

The AP based their article, "Papers Back Korean Refugee Claims" dated December 29, 1999, on six Air Force pilots interviews: Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Dewald, Major (Retired) Hall, Major (Retired) Kroman, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Son, Colonel (Retired) Lancaster, and Colonel (Retired) Wimer. The article claimed that: "American jets attacked groups of Koreans in civilian clothes on suspicion they harbored enemy infiltrators." However, with the exception of Colonel (Retired) Lancaster, who declined to be interviewed, the remaining pilots told the U.S. Review Team that the AP sensationalized the information they provided. For example Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Dewald told the U.S. Review Team that no people wearing civilian clothes were ever attacked unless they were observed firing on -- or were part of a group that was firing on -- friendly forces or aircraft. Further, Major (Retired) Kroman claimed the AP misquoted him.<sup>39</sup> With regard to civilian casualties during the Korean War, Major (Retired) Kroman said he told the AP he "couldn't say for a fact civilians were not killed in the war," but the AP quoted him in their story as stating he was "sure civilians were killed."

#### **H. Battlefield Observers**

Individuals identified as Battlefield Observers were those whose duty position required them to circulate through their units' area of operations and obtain current information on topics such as unit morale, the current friendly and enemy situation, and news stories concerning the unit. Included in this category are military policemen, chaplains, staff judge advocates, and aerial observers. Civilian reporters present in the 1st Cavalry Division area during the last week of July 1950 are also included in this category.

During the course of the interview process, the U.S. Review Team interviewed members of the 1st Cavalry Division Public Information Office and civilian reporters covering the conflict at the time of the incident. The 1st Cavalry Public Information Office, a team of reporters and photographers, produced press reports for release outside the 1st Cavalry Division. In addition, the U.S. Review Team took statements from veterans of the 1st Cavalry Division's 545th Military Police Company, whose mission included control of traffic, refugees, and stragglers; the 1st Cavalry Division Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, whose mission included legal work for the Division's major units and the investigation of

possible war crimes; and Army chaplains assigned in the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Due to the nature of their mission and their presence throughout the 1st Cavalry Division area of operations, it is likely that military policemen, lawyers, and chaplains would have heard of this incident.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed five civilian reporters who covered the Korean War and were present in Korea at the time of the alleged incident: Jim Becker, Max Desfor, Lachie McDonald, Walter Simmons, and Denis Warner.<sup>40</sup> Each reporter said that he found the occurrence of such an incident difficult to believe. If killings had happened, they believed someone in the press would have reported the incident. Mr. McDonald and Mr. Warner were both in the 7th Cavalry Regiment area of operations at the time of the alleged incident. They would have been in a position to hear about an event involving refugees taking place in the immediate area. During the conflict, reporters did in fact report incidents involving the death or injury of Korean civilians.<sup>41</sup>

The U.S. Review Team interviewed eight individuals from the 1st Cavalry Division Public Information Office. None had heard of the No Gun Ri incident while in Korea. Several stated that if they had heard of an incident of this nature, where refugees or civilians were killed, a reporter would have been sent to cover the story. The first time they heard of the No Gun Ri incident was when the AP story broke in the fall of 1999. Eight members of the Public Information Office were interviewed including the officer in charge of the 1st Cavalry Public Information Office at the time of the incident. One officer recalled that he heard of North Korean soldiers infiltrating American positions disguised as South Korean refugees in July and August 1950.<sup>42</sup> During the conflict he also recalled that he visited the regiments often and talked to many individuals who were in the area; no one mentioned the incident alleged to have occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Additionally, in March 2000, this officer attended a reunion of the 1st Cavalry Public Information Office. He said that he and his fellow veterans discussed the No Gun Ri incident, and no one remembered hearing of a similar event involving refugees in July 1950.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed an officer who served as an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate in the 1st Cavalry Division Staff Judge Advocate's Office.<sup>43</sup> His duties included providing legal support to combat units such as preparing courts-martials, boards, and the investigation of war crimes. In his interview with the U.S. Team, he stated that he does not believe a massacre in the vicinity of No Gun Ri could have taken place without the Staff Judge Advocate's Office learning about it. He and another 1st Cavalry Division Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer, regularly visited the frontline units. He does not recall hearing of an incident like the one alleged to have occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed three veterans (two officers and an enlisted military policeman (MP)) from the 545th Military Police Company, 1st Cavalry Division.<sup>44</sup> An officer stated that the 545th Military Police Company

handled traffic control; refugees and stragglers; and, later, the reconnaissance mission for the division when the 16th Reconnaissance Company suffered significant losses late in July and early August 1950. With regard to refugees, he said the 545th Military Police Company would screen refugees at checkpoints; otherwise, they just kept them moving through the area and kept the roads clear. An officer stated that the Military Police in the unit performed random searches and sometimes found refugees with parts of weapons and / or ammunition. All three men recall hearing that the North Koreans were using refugee groups to infiltrate behind friendly lines. Later in the war, the enlisted MP recalled seeing dead bodies dressed in white lying along the roadside with weapons strewn next to them. These veterans did not recall anything about an incident like what allegedly occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. One officer interviewed, said he attended almost every Division staff meeting and regularly worked with all commanders in his duties as the Division's Military Police Company Commander; he did not recall anyone ever mentioning an incident like No Gun Ri. He believed that the battalion commanders would have reported something as significant as what the South Korean witnesses said occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri or that he would have received reports through his unit or obtained information from his unit's patrols.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed an officer who was the 7th Cavalry Regimental Chaplain at the time of the alleged incident, and the Chaplain, who replaced him.<sup>45</sup> They remember counseling soldiers on a daily basis on personal concerns, but they stated that no soldier ever sought counseling for an incident similar to the mass killings of noncombatants alleged to have occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

The U.S. Review Team interviewed an officer who was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division's air section and who flew numerous observation missions at the outset of the conflict.<sup>46</sup> During one of his missions flown during the latter part of July 1950, he recalled being approximately five miles to the northwest of Kumchon (which is approximately 14 miles southeast from No Gun Ri) when he monitored a request to fire white phosphorous at 400 to 500 Korean refugees moving along some railroad tracks. From his aircraft, he determined that the refugees were not a threat and immediately stopped the fire mission. No rounds were fired. During this time frame, he also noted a continuous flow of refugees moving to the southeast towards the Naktong River and what later became the Pusan Perimeter. He did not observe and was not aware of any other incidents where U.S. forces targeted Korean refugees.

## **I. Soldiers on the Battlefield**

After completing the witness interviews, the U.S. Review Team based their assessment on the interviews of those veterans who may have been in the No Gun Ri area. Based on other records, the U.S. Review Team knew many other veterans passed by or were in the vicinity around the village of No Gun Ri

in late July 1950. The discussion in this chapter reviews interviews with veterans and not the entire historical record.

The U.S. Team's methodology was geographically and historically driven: the U.S. Review Team correlated positions, which the veterans claimed to have occupied, with geographic locations derived from historical accounts. For example, most 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, veterans remembered off-loading ships in Korea in July 1950. Based on historical data, their off-load would have taken place at Pohangdong on July 22, 1950. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment veterans then remembered moving by truck or train to an assembly area. They did not recall the name of that assembly area, but it was probably in the vicinity of Hwanggan. Next they then began their movement from Hwanggan towards Yongdong to support the 8th and the 5th Cavalry Regiments. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, did not get to Yongdong as it fell to the enemy on July 25, 1950, prior to the battalion's arrival. However, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, would have been relatively close to Yongdong since they began their approximate 10-mile movement to Yongdong from Hwanggan on or about July 24, 1950. On July 25 - 26, 1950, something occurred, an order to move or perceived enemy contact that precipitated a very chaotic 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, withdrawal. This event was the single best memory milestone during the U.S. veteran interviews. The location to which the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, withdrew would have been in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.

U.S. Review Team identified 37 individuals as being present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. In this section of the report, these witnesses are identified by their position in July 1950 (officer, noncommissioned officer, enlisted soldier, pilot or reporter). Witnesses are not identified by name to protect their privacy. While other veterans may have been in the vicinity of No Gun Ri, the U.S. Review Team could not place them in the vicinity of No Gun Ri with any degree of certainty based on their statements.

Of these veterans, two enlisted soldiers said they fired in the direction of the refugees.<sup>47</sup> One soldier stated that he fired over the heads of the refugees to keep them pinned down, and another soldier said he fired into the refugees only after receiving fire from their direction. Two more men -- a noncommissioned officer and an enlisted soldier -- occupied positions close enough to the double railroad overpass to witness the events there.<sup>48</sup> The rest of the interviewees were in outlying positions some distance from the double railroad overpass and could observe some of the events there.

Statements from the veterans revealed the following:

- No individual recalled being given orders to shoot and kill civilian refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.



- Several soldiers assumed that there was an order to fire on the civilians because artillery and mortar fires were used that may have hit the civilians. While these soldiers were adamant that there was an order, they had no information to support their assertions. These soldiers did not know who gave the order, did not hear the order, did not know when the order was given, and they personally did not receive the order.
- Twenty-eight individuals recalled observing refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.
- No individual recalled seeing Korean National Police near No Gun Ri in late July 1950.
- Four individuals recalled seeing casualties as a result of the firing into a tunnel or culvert (A soldier saw four to five bodies, but he does not know if they were wounded or dead. He thinks they were injured from strafing. Another soldier saw a few people he thought were dead from a distance, but the bodies were gone the next morning. A third soldier saw bodies from a distance, but he did not know the number or if they were wounded or dead. A fourth soldier thinks he saw several to 15 casualties but does not know if they were wounded or dead).
- One individual recalled seeing medical support being provided to the individuals in civilian clothing under the double railroad overpass in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.
- Twenty-four individuals believed they were in the No Gun Ri area from less than 24 hours to two days. Five individuals believed they might have been in the No Gun Ri area longer than two days.
- Ten individuals stated that they either received or saw fire in the vicinity of No Gun Ri coming from the direction of the refugees [The first witness (saw firing from overpass/tunnel) - I couldn't say who was firing. I only knew that firing was coming from the direction of the overpass to us. Fire was coming from the tunnel...at night; the second witness (received fire from the vicinity of the tunnels or overpasses) - we heard small arms fire, machine-gun fire and rifle fire in that direction and we looked over there, and then we received some rifle fire from the tunnel; the third witness (saw firing from culvert/ditch) - off to my left there was a group of refugees that were firing at the Heavy Weapons Company, and the Heavy Weapons Company returned fire at those refugees who were in a culvert; the fourth witness (saw firing coming out of the tunnel)- it seemed to me like it was more or less rifle shots coming out of the tunnel, and they were single shots; the fifth witness (received fire from the area of the tunnel in the side of a mountain) - We did receive some mortar fire and we did receive some small arms fire. Nothing of any great intensity at all; the sixth witness (saw firing at a road or railroad track) - Probably the reason why I remember that is because that was really the first encounter of engagement, shooting-rifle shooting back in one direction or whatever...the first thing that I can call an encounter with the so-called enemy; the seventh witness (saw firing coming out of the culvert) - I saw the flash of fire coming out of the culvert toward Howell Company not in my direction; the eighth witness (saw firing

coming out of the tunnel) - automatic fire flashes came out of the tunnel around here; the ninth witness (saw firing at roadblock) - I'm not sure if they fired in response to somebody firing at them or how it occurred. I just don't know...It just kind of erupted and we didn't know what had happened because they had a roadblock down there; the tenth witness (center of the railroad tracks facing the refugees) - When I heard the Burp gun go off and they said we were being fired on, it was just a few seconds after that when a shell, the first shell come in.].

- Seven individuals recalled seeing casualties outside the tunnels.
- Twelve individuals stated that people in civilian clothing were fired upon outside of the tunnels / bridges in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (One noncommissioned officer said refugees were hit by US indirect and machine gun fire; thought there may have been 50 (refugee) casualties; a soldier saw a group of 5 to 10 Koreans, dressed in white overgarments, firing from a ditch along the road at US forces and US forces returned fire; another noncommissioned officer saw mortars, rifles and machineguns fired toward the refugees; a second soldier thought 10 to 15 refugees were fired at but did not know what initiated the firing; an officer remembered that one of the line companies fired weapons at a group of about 50 Korean refugees, but none of the refugees were hit or injured. They did not appear to be a threat so he stopped the shooting; a third soldier said a machine gun fired over the heads of the refugees on tracks. Burp gun fire came from the tracks toward friendly positions and US soldiers returned fire; a third noncommissioned officer said refugees kept stacking up at a roadblock used to prevent them from passing through US lines, shots were fired at that location; a fourth noncommissioned officer remembers mortars hitting near the refugees; a fourth soldier said a heavy machine gun fired a burst of rounds in front of the refugees, did not think anyone had been wounded. One machine gun began firing into the tunnel during the night. The following morning, a young Korean refugee was shot at but not hit; a fifth soldier saw rounds impacting in the vicinity refugees on tracks. He also thought that he saw secondary explosions following the impacting rounds; a fifth noncommissioned officer said rounds were fired in the vicinity of refugees because they were just sitting on the road blocking everything; a second officer heard shots fired at the refugees but could not tell where they were coming from).
- Three individuals recalled displacing South Koreans out of villages.
- Sixteen individuals said they saw U.S. aircraft strafing targets in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (Ten of the 16 did not observe the target and two of the 16 said their position was strafed. Four of the 16 said U.S. aircraft strafed refugees (A noncommissioned officer said refugees were killed when an enemy tank they were riding on was strafed; a soldier said refugees in the vicinity of an enemy tank were killed when it was strafed; an officer said refugees were hurt when an enemy column that was intermingled with them was strafed; another noncommissioned officer observed aircraft strafing refugees June-August 1950).

- All members of the chain of command, which the U.S. Review Team interviewed, did not recall hearing of a "No Gun Ri" incident prior to the AP story in September 1999 (8 officers).
- Ten individuals saw enemy tanks in the vicinity of No Gun Ri (2 officers, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 3 enlisted soldiers).
- Seven individuals heard and observed mortar, tank, or artillery fire landing among the refugees (A noncommissioned officer said refugees were coming down the road and a South Korean interpreter told them they couldn't come by this way ... a warning shot from artillery was fired ... they kept coming and about a dozen artillery rounds landed among the refugees; a soldier said about six mortar rounds landed toward the front of the refugee group to warn them not to cross the bridge; a second soldier said four to six enemy tank rounds landed among the refugees that were trying to take cover in a culvert; a second noncommissioned officer said refugees were coming down a road with hills on both sides toward U.S. lines when mortar rounds landed among them, which made them disperse; a third noncommissioned officer said mortar rounds were fired in the vicinity of the tunnel ... don't know whose mortars they were ... the refugees were sitting on the road blocking everything when the rounds were fired; a fourth noncommissioned officer said two mortar rounds landed among the refugees by a bridge and they scattered, they were not allowed to pass our lines; a third soldier said refugees were coming down the railroad tracks and artillery or mortar rounds landed among them ... don't know if it was friendly or enemy fire).
- Sixteen individuals recalled hearing weapons fire lasting from only a few minutes to 60 minutes in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. (A noncommissioned officer - not very long, max 4-5 minutes; a soldier - very short; a second soldier - one to four machine-gun bursts were fired; a second noncommissioned officer - not five minutes; a third noncommissioned officer - refugees in ditch were engaged for 15-20 minutes; a third soldier - 15 to 20 minutes; a fourth soldier - sporadic fire, 30 minutes to an hour 20-30 rounds at a time; a fifth soldier - 15 minutes; a fourth noncommissioned officer - it wasn't more than 5 minutes if that long; a fifth noncommissioned officer - not more than 10 rounds fired; a sixth soldier - a matter of minutes; an officer - 15 minutes; a sixth noncommissioned officer - 5 to 10 minutes; a seventh noncommissioned officer - 5, 10 maybe 20-30 minutes, I don't know; an eighth noncommissioned officer - whole incident lasted 4 or 5 minutes; a ninth noncommissioned officer - just minutes).

The U.S. Review Team also interviewed veterans from the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. Those units withdrew through the No Gun Ri area along the Yongdong-Hwanggan road around the time of the alleged incident. Most of the veterans interviewed did not describe the large numbers of casualties that were described by Korean witnesses. In fact, most veterans interviewed stated that

they saw nothing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri that corroborated the allegations in the Associated Press report and the Korean account.

## **J. Sketch of Events**

U.S. Army veterans' statements described events, which occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The descriptions included references to multiple terrain features in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. These references are to a double-arched tunnel, a culvert, a single-arched tunnel, a railroad tunnel that goes through a hill or mountain, and references to roads and streams. Likewise, Korean witnesses describe these same terrain features. Events appeared to have occurred at or near all of these features.

A review of veterans' statements indicated that most veterans were warned by their chain of command or through word of mouth of incidents in which North Korean soldiers infiltrated refugee groups either by intermingling with them or disguising themselves as civilians in order to pass through U.S. lines; many veterans had first-hand experience of this. Some veterans recall an exchange of fire at different times and near different terrain features in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. A single veteran recalled a high body count.<sup>49</sup> However, he could not recognize terrain features of the No Gun Ri area from the models, maps, and photographs that the U.S. Review Team showed to him. This veteran's description of events was so inconsistent with other descriptions of the events the U.S. Review Team was unable to conclude, based upon his statement, that hundreds of deaths occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Some of the inconsistencies in the veteran's statement were: he believes the enemy was firing on the civilians; two enemy soldiers in civilian clothing were discovered among the refugee casualties; dead bodies were stacked on the railroad track right before they left the area; American soldiers that were amongst the refugees were killed and wounded and they had to immediately depart the area because the North Koreans were attacking them.<sup>50</sup> Another veteran that he identified as being there with him did not support his statement when interviewed.

Events appear to have transpired in several areas: a double-arched tunnel like the one described in media accounts, a culvert that is a relatively smaller opening underneath railroad tracks, a single-arched tunnel that is a relatively larger opening underneath railroad tracks, and a railroad tunnel that goes through a hill or mountain. While all these features are located in the No Gun Ri area, features like these are also present in other areas along the route of withdrawal that the 7th Cavalry Regiment used during the outset of the conflict. The U.S. Review Team believes that the similarities of the terrain features in different areas contributed to confusion in the veterans' memories. What occurs in each event at these locations varies with each veteran's memories, but something appears to have transpired at each location. Given the lapse of time, what happened at each terrain feature cannot be reconstructed to any degree of

reasonable certainty. However based solely upon witness interviews, some veterans' statements support the following sketch of events.

The double-arched tunnel is the double railroad overpass and is the principal man-made terrain feature that refugees have described in their accounts. Photographs of it have been featured in the Associated Press reports. In veterans' interviews, this feature has been referred to as a double-arched tunnel, double tunnels, tunnels, and culverts. The term that was used in the interview is the term that is used in the following paragraphs.

Based upon interviews with some veterans, weapons were fired near or at the double-arched tunnel during daylight hours after elements of 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, arrived in the vicinity of the double arched tunnel. Some refugees were observed moving on the railroad tracks.<sup>51</sup> U.S. soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, occupied positions in the vicinity of the double-arched tunnel.<sup>52</sup> Two soldiers stated that they observed U.S. soldiers were fired upon from the double tunnel.<sup>53</sup> Two soldiers stated that there was machine-gun fire on the entrances of tunnels.<sup>54</sup> Two soldiers stated U.S. soldiers returned fire for anywhere from five to 15 minutes.<sup>55</sup> A veteran stated that he directed the soldiers to "cease fire."<sup>56</sup> One soldier believed there might have been 50 casualties.<sup>57</sup> Another soldier stated he carried a refugee boy back into the tunnels under the bridge and saw U.S. medical personnel providing medical aid.<sup>58</sup> This soldier saw only 15-20 refugees in the tunnel.<sup>59</sup> Two soldiers stated that there was mortar and artillery fire in the area at this time.<sup>60</sup> The next morning one soldier stated that he saw between four and nine bodies lying in the culverts and other refugees in the area. He also saw burp guns and grenades inside the culvert.<sup>61</sup>

Based again upon interviews with some veterans, weapons were also fired near or at the single-arched tunnel, which is located 250 yards from the double railroad overpass, either the late afternoon of the day that weapons were fired at the double railroad overpass or the day after. Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, occupied this area. Soldiers saw refugees in a large single tunnel.<sup>62</sup> At night one soldier stated that one machine gun fired into the tunnel, and he recalled seeing red tracers ricocheting around the tunnel entrance.<sup>63</sup> Another soldier stated that soldiers fired a few rounds at the tunnel to keep the refugees inside.<sup>64</sup> The following morning a refugee boy emerged from the tunnel, and, according to one soldier, a rifleman fired on him but he was not hurt.<sup>65</sup> Refugees were observed in front of the single-arched tunnel, possibly crossing from the railroad tracks to the road. Based upon the veterans' statements, the refugees could have been shot by small-arms fire near the single-arched tunnel opening. One veteran passed through a single-arched tunnel while on a reconnaissance patrol and observed over 100 refugees. He recalled that there were many casualties and that there were old men, women, and children in the group.<sup>66</sup> The veteran thought that the casualties were caused by the North Koreans.

Finally, the veteran's statements used to develop the sketches of events above and the other veteran's interviews indicated that they did not hear, receive, or see in writing any orders given to fire on refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The veterans interviewed who could describe events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri did not support the Korean account describing many casualties and prolonged fire on the double railroad overpass.

## **K. Overview of the U.S. Air Force Witness Interviews**

Associated Press reports also indicated that air strikes occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri; therefore, the U.S. Review Team included the statements of U. S. Air Force veterans in the review. The pilots had different perspectives of the air order of battle, depending on the types of aircraft and missions they flew during the early days of the Korean War. Once again, the review below is based solely upon veterans' statements. For example, the U.S. Review Team knows that the pilots' recollections of the armament they carried are not correct, but these are their recollection of events.<sup>67</sup> At first, fighter-bomber pilots assigned to the 35<sup>th</sup> Fighter-Bomber Squadron (FBS) flew missions in the F-80 "Shooting Star" aircraft out of Itazuke Air Base (AB), Japan, and converted in the mid-summer of 1950 to the F-51 "Mustang" out of Taegu Air Base, Republic of Korea. At first, pilots assigned to the 9<sup>th</sup> FBS flew missions with brand-new F-80C aircraft from Japan and in mid-September 1950 operated out of Taegu AB, ROK.

Pilots from each squadron admitted that missions were not as effective when operating from Japan due to the tight fuel limitations of the F-80. These pilots stated that they could ill-afford to loiter over Korea searching for targets because of this short fuel capability, and they often returned to base with minimum fuel on board to complete the mission. One pilot stated that after striking a target, he and his fellow pilots would immediately contact forward air controllers (FAC) for additional targets until low fuel warnings forced them to return to base.<sup>68</sup> He estimated that the average mission from Itazuke AB lasted approximately two hours and ten minutes, with approximately 70% of the mission dedicated to time enroute to and from the target area. This limitation was alleviated when the 9<sup>th</sup> FBS began operating out of Taegu AB in September 1950. He also commented on the navigational challenges due to the lack of radio aids in Korea as well as the time required to 'step down' through weather patterns over Korea.

Several pilots pointed out that the F-80 was designed for air-to-air operations and was not suited for the close air support and air-to-ground role it performed during the Korean War.<sup>69</sup> Although pilots recalled excellent visibility from the cockpits of both the F-80 and the F-51 aircraft, the high airspeeds of the F-80 made acquiring and attacking ground targets in a single pass difficult. The slower airspeeds of the "Mustang" and other propeller-driven aircraft flown by the

U.S. Navy and Marines enabled their pilots to make more accurate target identification runs prior to commencing air strikes.

Forward Air Control (FAC) pilots flying the T-6 “Texan” aircraft in Korea also commented on the limitations of the F-80s in Korea. A pilot commented that slower planes such as the F-51 Mustangs flown by U.S. and Australian pilots, as well as Navy aircraft, were much more effective and accurate than F-80 jets.<sup>70</sup> The problem this pilot highlighted concerning F-80s was their lack of ability to identify and confirm the target assigned by FACs. They loitered at high altitudes to conserve fuel until a FAC directed them onto a target. They would then descend at high airspeeds and attack with rockets, machine guns, and finally bombs, all in one pass. He said the average time from initial contact to the end of an attack with a flight of F-80s was approximately five minutes, and this pilot never saw an F-80 make more than one pass on a target. Propeller-driven aircraft, on the other hand, had time to make multiple confirmation passes (often firing initial tracer rounds visible by the T-6 pilots who could confirm they were firing in the correct location). These aircraft sometimes spent more than 20-30 minutes working a single enemy target. He also reported occasions when there was confusion over battle damage assessments resulting from effects on the same target.

Pilots recalled that both the F-80 and F-51 aircraft carried virtually the same armament but in differing quantities. Fifty-caliber machine guns, five-inch high velocity aerial rockets (HVAR), various bombs (500-pound common), and napalm tanks (arrived in theatre within the first two months of the war) were commonly carried on strike missions. Pilots commented on the effectiveness of napalm destroying enemy trains using tunnels for cover. Many pilots agreed that the WWII leftover HVAR rockets were highly inaccurate and unpredictable. One pilot remembered firing a rocket from his F-80 that reversed its course 180 degrees, nearly shooting him down.<sup>71</sup> The statements by the pilots were in general terms; like their fellow veterans in the U.S. Army, pilots struggled to recall day-to-day events.

The interviews with the 17 veterans from the Air Force revealed the following:

- Sixteen of the 17 USAF veterans interviewed were under the impression that NKPA soldiers were infiltrating civilian refugee groups.
- At least five pilots interviewed visually confirmed that this infiltration was taking place. Interviewees stated they would have refused any orders to strafe civilians intentionally, although no such orders were ever received.
- The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) interviewee regularly observed NKPA soldiers dressed in civilian clothing.
- Nobody interviewed participated in, or had any knowledge of, anyone participating in the strafing of civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in late July 1950.

- All USAF interviewees vividly recalled stern verbal policies implemented to prevent the attack of non-combatants although no one recalled any written policies on this subject.
- All pilots interviewed stated visibility from their cockpits (F-51, F-80, and T-6) was excellent. Although visibility was good, nearly all pilots interviewed (especially F-80 pilots) said it was very difficult or impossible to distinguish between enemy troops and friendly forces, primarily as a result of the high airspeeds flown.
- Although several pilots interviewed remembered the name Yong Dong and knew they flew missions on July 26, 1950, none could remember any mission resembling the alleged events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. None of the USAF veterans interviewed had heard of any incident in the vicinity of No Gun Ri until the recent media coverage.

Major General (Retired) Turner C. Rogers was interviewed because while conducting research for this review, an Air Force historian discovered an archived memorandum, written by then Colonel Rogers, the Deputy Chief for Operations, Advanced Headquarters Fifth Air Force, to his commander on July 25, 1950, with the following subject: Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees, regarding policy of strafing civilian refugees. Major General (Retired) Rogers had arrived in Korea only a few days before writing the memorandum, which expressed concerns about an Army request to strafe civilians approaching U.S. positions. In his memo, Major General (Retired) Rogers recommended a policy be established "whereby Fifth Air Force aircraft will not attack civilian refugees, unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts." The recommended policy appears to be the practice followed by the pilots the U.S. Review Team interviewed. Pilots sought out targets such as trucks, tanks, moving troops,<sup>72</sup> and groups of men in uniform.<sup>73</sup> The pilots fired when they were told a target was hostile<sup>74</sup> and fired back when fired upon.<sup>75</sup> Major General (Retired) Rogers also recommended informing Eighth Army Headquarters of this position, but no other documents or policy directives relating to this memo have been located. After the passage of 50 years, determining why this memorandum was written or to place it into context is difficult. Major General (Retired) Rogers was interviewed, but he did not remember the July 25, 1950, memo and did not remember any details about his duty position at Advance Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.<sup>76</sup>

### **III. KOREAN WITNESS REVIEW**

#### **A. Purpose**

The purpose of this section is to provide a review of the Korean witness' statements. The Korean witness statements reflect different perspectives, contain varying amounts of detail, and provide some common elements. Each witness statement describes the events using different words



and images. Some statements are clearer and more detailed than others. When one reviews all the statements, a picture of what the Koreans believe happened in July 1950 emerges.

The review creates an initial composite sketch of the Korean witnesses' view of the events during the last week of July 1950. The initial composite sketch contains six key events. This section of the chapter will outline each key event described in the witness statements and will present an impression of the incident based on the witness statements. The review will summarize the witness statements without weighing the inherent probability or improbability of the witnesses' description of events. However, the review will note discrepancies, inconsistencies, and other problems in the statements that may reflect problems with memory.

## **B. Media Accounts**

Reporters have interviewed Korean witnesses<sup>77</sup> as well as the U.S. veterans. In fact, the Associated Press (AP) interviewed the Korean witnesses for their September 1999 Associated Press Report.<sup>78</sup> The Associated Press summarized their interviews stating: "The 30 Korean claimants, survivors and victims' relatives said it was an unprovoked, three-day carnage. 'The American soldiers played with our lives like boys playing with flies,' said Chun Choon-ja, a twelve year old girl at that time."<sup>79</sup>

The Associated Press further wrote that: "'People pulled dead bodies around them for protection,' said Chung Koo-ho, 61. 'Mothers wrapped their children with blankets and hugged them with their backs toward the entrances. ...My mother died on the second day of the shooting.'" The AP report paints a vivid picture of events from the Korean perspective. The report also states that: "Sounds of slaughter haunt Park Hee-sook's memory too. 'I can still hear moans of women dying in a pool of blood,' said Park, then a girl of 16. 'Children cried and clung to their dead mothers.'"<sup>80</sup> The AP explains that: "All 24 Korean survivors interviewed individually by the AP said they remembered no North Koreans or gunfire directed at Americans." The AP report does not identify all "24 Korean survivors" by name, however.

## **C. Korean Statements**

The sources of the Korean witness statements available for analysis are as follows:

- The undated interview summary conducted by the No Gun Ri Truth Investigation Testimony Hearing Team. This document captures the salient points of most of the principal witness' stories.
- Detailed statements that the No Gun Ri Fact-Finding Panel took from 24 witnesses in the Yong-dong District Office Operations Room from

November 25 to 26, 1999. Most of these statements came from individuals already interviewed by the No Gun Ri Truth Investigation Team. When a witness gave a statement to the No Gun Ri Truth Investigation Hearing Team and the No Gun Ri Fact Finding Panel, the two statements were compared.

- Statements from a second round of interviews that the Fact-Finding Panel conducted from December 29 to 30, 1999; the Panel interviewed 17 witnesses during this two-day session.
- Witness statements that appear to have accompanied one of the initial claimant petitions.
- Eyewitness accounts chronicled in the Investigation Report published by the Committee for Justice and Human Rights of the National Council of Churches in Korea on April 22, 1998.
- Questionnaires that the No Gun Ri Incident Fact-Finding Team for the Korean Ministry of Defense sent to other potential witnesses or to people who lived in the No Gun Ri area in July 1950. Only those questionnaires with names (39 of the 45 in that packet) that include some form of narrative response are included in this analysis.
- Finally, the U.S. Review Team requested that the South Korean witnesses answer 48 specific questions. Twenty witnesses provided some short-answer responses to these questions, but only those witnesses whose answers included sufficient relevant detail were included in this analysis by name.

The statements were translated from Korean to English. For the purpose of this review, a description of an event or events attributed to a person by name constitutes a witness statement. Seventy-six people gave some form of statement. The U.S. Review Team had multiple statements from the same people. These statements included summarized accounts, questionnaires, and question and answer transcripts. The statements of 49 out of 76 witnesses included sufficient enough detail for close scrutiny and analysis.

#### **D. Initial Composite Sketch of Events**

Many Korean statements describe a similar sequence of events from July 25 to July 29, 1950. Each witness offers a slightly different version with his or her own details. An overview of the statements yields the following initial composite sketch of events. The initial composite sketch of events is a simple compilation of the witnesses' statements.

- On July 25, U.S. Army soldiers urgently instructed the residents of Im Gae Ri, together with some refugees from Joo Gok Ri, to begin moving south along the Seoul - Pusan road to avoid the danger that the shifting battlefield would bring them. (The village of Im Gae Ri is three miles off the main road.)

- Led by the soldiers, the refugees trudged south along the road in the late afternoon. (The route led toward Pusan but actually followed a southwest-to-northeast trajectory at this point.)
- After a brief foot march, the U.S. soldiers directed the refugees to a riverbank (possibly near Ha Ga Ri) to spend the night, but no one could sleep because of an artillery battery firing nearby. The soldiers shot at two or three of the refugees who tried to stand and move around during the night, possibly wounding or killing some people.
- The next morning, July 26, the refugees awoke to find the soldiers gone and the area quiet. The refugees continued southward on their own, family cows and oxcarts in tow, until they reached Seo Song Won Ri. Withdrawing American vehicles made walking on the road nearly impossible for the refugees.
- The refugees soon encountered an American roadblock, and the soldiers directed them onto the railroad tracks running parallel to, and above, the road to relieve some of the traffic congestion. Up to 400 hungry and tired refugees sat down to eat some multi-grain powder. They sent small children to seek out water nearby. Nearly 100 abandoned refugee bags from a group that had passed the area earlier littered the railroad tracks.
- Three or four American soldiers walked among the refugees, inspecting their bags by picking at the contents with fixed bayonets. The soldiers confiscated all farming tools or anything that might resemble a weapon.
- One soldier in a nearby bean field spoke into a radio while the soldiers carried out their inspection.
- A lone, propeller-driven reconnaissance airplane buzzed overhead unthreateningly.
- Suddenly, the soldiers disappeared and, within minutes, American jet aircraft strafed the seated refugees with bombs and machine-gun fire.<sup>81</sup> Refugees fled in all directions. Scores of people died instantly. Others fell wounded and cried for help. Cows and oxen exploded in blood. The refugees' baggage burst into flames. Many took cover in a small, water-filled ditch below the tracks.
- Once the airplanes left the scene, several American soldiers ventured forth and directed the surviving refugees into the twin tunnels beneath the railroad tracks. Many refugees had already fled, and the soldiers fired at those who continued to run. One of the tunnels had a stream running through it.
- Bullets suddenly saturated the tunnel's interior in concentrated bursts. The shooting forced everyone to remain prone in the crowded tunnels. More people died from the American small-arms fire.
- Two soldiers approached the tunnel entrance and spoke in English or Japanese with some of the refugees. The soldiers quickly departed.
- The shooting continued for four days, from July 26 to July 29. During this time, several of the younger men and children escaped over the mountain in the dark, leaving only women, children, and the elderly in the tunnel.

(For a discussion of the tactical situation of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, see Chapter 3.)

- Seven refugees witnessed or participated in the piling of dead bodies in front of the tunnel's entrance to protect those still alive in the back.
- The refugee's water source was a blood-saturated stream that ran through one of the tunnels.
- On July 29, the refugees ventured forth from the tunnel once they realized that the soldiers had departed.

### **E. Key Events According to the Korean Witnesses**

The narrative outlined above offers several key events for analysis. These six key events are as follows:

- a. The evacuation from Im Gae Ri (often spelled Imkyeh-ri) on July 25.
- b. The night spent on the riverbank (July 25).
- c. The move to the railroad tracks and the personal-effects inspection (July 26)
- d. The soldier talking on the radio and the subsequent air attack (July 26)
- e. The move to the twin tunnels and the U.S. soldiers' involvement in this process (July 26)
- f. The events inside the tunnel and the shooting that occurred (July 26 to July 29)

### **F. Review and Discussion**

The key events examined in further detail below represent a holistic approach to analyzing each witness's statements. The U.S. Review Team compared and contrasted all versions of a witness's statement and then compared these composite, one-person statements (49 in all) with the larger body of Korean witness statements. After the comparisons among the Korean witness statements, a particular witness's account of events may be corroborated or remain muddled, inconsistent, or inconclusive. In making these comparisons, the current age of the witness, the age of the witness at the time of the events described, and the amount of time that has passed since the events occurred were all considered because these factors affect one's ability to remember.

The analysis that follows will explore each of the six key events in detail and look for similarities and differences between the descriptions of the key events given by the witnesses. Witnesses are not described by name, but are referred to their status (child, teenager, and adult) in July 1950.

## **G. First Key Event - The Evacuation from Im Gae Ri on July 25, 1950**

Some Korean witnesses refer to a hostile attitude on the part of the U.S. soldiers who came to Im Gae Ri (sometimes spelled Imkae-ri, Imkyeh-ri, and Im Ga Ri) and directed the refugees gathering there to evacuate.

- Twenty-eight of the 49 witnesses specify that several U.S. soldiers told the refugees to pack up and head south in the late afternoon or early evening of July 25.
- Some witnesses refer to five or six soldiers while others mention two soldiers plus a Japanese-speaking interpreter. The Korean witness statements indicate that U.S. soldiers in the area encouraged the refugees gathering in Im Gae Ri, some of whom hailed from Joo Gok Ri, to leave the area to avoid the potential fighting expected to occur between the U.S. and North Korean forces. Some Korean witnesses recall that the soldiers offered them transportation that never materialized.
- Only 16 Korean witnesses claim that U.S. soldiers evacuated them specifically from their home village of Im Gae Ri on July 25. Other witnesses who claim that the soldiers evacuated them simply refer to 'an evacuation' but do not specify the location.
- Ten Korean witnesses mention the evacuation but state that they were from other villages or were simply evacuated through Im Gae Ri without specifying their village of origin.
- The 10 Korean witnesses who indicate that they originated from other villages name a wide variety of hometowns. Some of these 10 witnesses simply explain that they left their own unnamed village for another safe haven or passed through other villages like Joo Gok Ri or Im Gae Ri. One 11-year-old witness mentions that he hid in a cave called Kwangsan for three days following his evacuation. Several witnesses state that they were evacuated from the following locations: Joo Gok Ri, Yak Mok Ri, Seo Song Won, and Ha Ga Ri.

Four witnesses between the ages of 11 and 17 indicate that the soldiers were hostile and aggressive toward the refugees during the evacuation.

- A Korean witness (17 years old) remembered the U.S. soldiers treating the refugees like North Korean prisoners.
- A Korean witness (child) asserted that the soldiers prodded the refugees with rifles and shot three or four people who strayed from the group.
- Two additional witnesses describe the soldiers as yelling, gesturing, or firing their weapons in an effort to exhort the group to move southward.

These four accounts are the only ones that mention any hostility on behalf of the American soldiers at this point, which suggests that the behavior either occurred in isolated instances or that the refugees perceived the soldiers'

mannerisms incorrectly. A pattern of hostility aimed at the refugees in this instance does not seem to be a strong, common theme.

#### **H. Second Key Event - The night spent on the riverbank (July 25 to 26)**

This second key event is important because several witnesses claim that the American soldiers shot and killed some refugees who attempted to leave the group during the night.

- A total of 16 witnesses from both age groups clearly recall that the U.S. soldiers directed them to a riverbank to spend the night
- Two witnesses suggested that the riverbank was near the hamlet of Ha Ga Ri with an elementary school close by.

One detail is repeated in some statements. The detail is a description of what may be the incessant firing of an artillery battery located nearby.

- Seven witnesses refer to a sleepless night caused by loud explosions in the refugees' vicinity.
- Some witnesses actually stated that the noise stemmed from an American artillery battery firing nearby.

Eleven witnesses report some measure of violence against a few refugees who tried to leave the group in the night to urinate or to do something else. Some witnesses recall finding dead bodies among the group the next morning. The witnesses who state people were shot are listed below.

- A Korean witness (child) asserted that the U.S. soldiers shot three or four refugees who strayed from the group.
- A second Korean witness (adult) stated that the soldiers shot one refugee who stood up without permission, and another Korean witness (adult) claimed that the soldiers shot four people for the same reason.
- A third witness (teenager) further reported that the soldiers shot three people during the evacuation, but he does not specify if the shooting occurred before arriving at the riverbank.
- A fourth witness (teenager) saw the soldiers shoot and wound a woman who did not move down to the riverbank quickly enough; in addition, a nearby child died from the shooting.

Despite these detailed assertions, the notion that the Americans fired upon the sleeping group falls outside the parameters of the common picture that emerges from all of the witness statements because a small number of witnesses (four) mention it. Each of these four accounts is different from the other accounts. Since the accounts lack common elements, they may or may not be

describing the same thing. In addition, a few Koreans described a pitched battle raging around the huddled group.

- A witness (teenager) insisted that severe fighting, which included artillery fire, occurred that night all around the refugees; small-arms crossfire even wounded some of the people.
- A second witness (child) described bullets swooshing and whizzing throughout the night, even killing three people.
- A third witness (teenager) further described fireballs falling onto the refugees in the night and killing some of them.

These accounts of a possible battle are moderately similar to one another; these accounts remain inconclusive and may be the product of confused memories. Overall, the refugees describe spending an uncomfortable and noisy night beside the river due to artillery pieces firing nearby and then awaking in the morning to discover that the soldiers had left the area.

### **I. Third Key Event - Move to the railroad tracks and baggage inspection (July 26)**

Witness descriptions of this event show a significant amount of agreement among the statements.

- Thirty-seven of the 49 witnesses state that the group continued to move south (actually northeast on the stretch of highway between Hwanggan) after departing the riverbank on the morning of July 26.
- Three Korean witnesses (two adults and a teenager) state that U.S. soldiers led the group away from the riverbank, a detail that is not included in other witness statements.
- The refugees, upon waking to discover that no American soldiers remained at the riverbank to escort them, simply continued moving along the Seoul - Pusan road until they encountered a U.S. roadblock at a place called Seo Song Won Ri (some accounts refer to the location as Seo Song Won and Sapjaegul).
- The roadblock, manned by a handful of U.S. soldiers, stopped the refugee group and directed them off the road and onto the railroad tracks that ran parallel to, and elevated above, the Seoul - Pusan road. Two witnesses stated that the soldiers wanted to make way for U.S. military vehicle traffic on the main road.
- The refugees climbed, with some difficulty, the small rise onto the railroad tracks above the twin tunnels. Many people struggled to get their cattle and oxen up the small hill.
- The soldiers directed the refugees to sit down once everyone was on the railroad tracks. The refugees then began to eat whatever food they had with them. Several witnesses mention that they ate a type of multi-grain powder and sent the smaller children to seek water.

- The number of refugees present at this point is unknown, but several hundred may have been present.
- One witness (teenager) remembers seeing over 100 abandoned bags littering the tracks.

A key detail that shares a broad consensus among the witnesses concerns the personal effects search the soldiers conducted.

- Twenty-three of the 49 witnesses clearly recall that a few U.S. soldiers walked among the refugees and inspected their bags. There are different descriptions of how the soldiers conducted the search. Some witnesses mention that the soldiers searched from both ends of the group simultaneously. Others recall that only two or three soldiers picked through the bags with bayonets affixed to the ends of their rifles.
- The search appeared to yield nothing. A Korean witness (teenager) specifies that a soldier discovered a YoonDoo, a metal device used to iron clothing, among his family's personal effects, but he does not mention if the soldiers confiscated the item.

Approximately one half of the statements support the common view that an inspection occurred, but the soldiers' search method and other minor details remain sketchy. Overall, the Korean accounts suggest with some consistency the following sequence of events. First, the refugees awoke on the riverbank on the morning of July 26 to discover that the soldiers had left the area. The group then continued generally south (actually northeast on the section of road previously mentioned) before encountering a U.S. roadblock at Seo Song Won Ri. The U.S. soldiers directed the refugee group onto the elevated railroad tracks running parallel to, and above, the twin tunnels. The soldiers then held the group in place and searched some or all of the refugees' personal effects.

#### **J. Fourth Key Event - Soldier talking on the radio and air attack (July 26)**

One can derive a general outline of this event from the witness statements, but little consensus exists on details.

- As the soldiers searched the refugees' bags on the railroad tracks, several witnesses testify that they observed a U.S. soldier using a radio.
- A Korean witness' account describes how a soldier operated the radio from a bean field nearby. The witness was a child in July 1950.
- 10 witnesses mention seeing a radio in use. Some of these witnesses believe that the soldier, or soldiers, used the radio to communicate with a propeller-driven plane circling overhead.

Of the 10 witnesses, no one explains the implied connection between



the radio operator and the plane, or planes, circling above. The timing of the air attack may have led them later to perceive a connection between the radio operator and the aircraft.<sup>82</sup>

On the other hand, a large number of the witnesses, 34 out of 49, state a strafing attack hit the refugees on the railroad tracks.

- Sixteen of these witnesses were 17 to 29 years of age.
- Some witnesses insist or imply that the attack was deliberate and had something to do with the soldiers fleeing the scene or talking on the radio.<sup>83</sup>
- Six witnesses recall seeing U.S. soldiers fleeing the area or noticing that the soldiers had disappeared. However, most witnesses clearly remember that the air attack occurred after the soldiers completed their baggage search.

The strafing attack is a common element in the Korean statements.

- Fourteen witnesses reported at least one reconnaissance plane flying overhead before the attack aircraft arrived on the scene.
- Two Korean witnesses (a child and a teenager) mentioned seeing two reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead.
- Three witnesses, when prompted by the U.S. questionnaire that asked them to distinguish the type of aircraft they saw, stated that the reconnaissance aircraft was propeller driven.

The sighting of the reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead before the strafing remains inconclusive in the absence of further supporting statements. However, many Korean witness accounts of the strafing indicate that more than one aircraft was involved in the strafing attack.

- Three Korean witnesses (1 adult and 2 teenagers) stated that as many as four planes participated in the air attack.
- In response to U.S. questions, several witnesses described the attacking aircraft as jets as opposed to propeller-driven aircraft.

Some Korean statements include the same observation that some type of high explosive ordnance fell upon the refugees.

- Three witnesses clearly mentioned that the planes used on-board machine-guns in addition to the bombs.
- At least three witnesses suggested that the aircraft made several passes on the group, but this point remains inconclusive.

The Korean descriptions of the strafing attack are horrific. The Korean accounts consistently state that the explosives devastated the people and the cattle located on the open railroad tracks. Several witnesses who were young at the time provide compelling descriptions of the events.

- A Korean witness (child) never mentions bombs or aircraft but instead remembers flames everywhere searing his face and bullets piercing his legs.
- A second Korean witness (child) remembers machine-gun bullets riddling her mother's legs while at the same time losing her left eye from an explosion.
- A third Korean witness (teenager) recounts that the explosions blew a large piece of flesh onto him; his own injuries left him barely able to walk.

These descriptions and the injuries described add poignancy to their statements. Other Koreans recalled a variety of similar details such as bodies dropping everywhere, cows and oxen exploding, and personal baggage catching fire. The casualty estimate for the air attack remains inconclusive because only five witnesses attempt to quantify the losses. The numbers range from 50 to 150 dead; in one instance, a witness (young adult) simply stated that hundreds died. No common number is currently available, but the overall body of statements strongly suggests that many people suffered from the air attack's effects.

Some Korean witnesses state that the soldiers fired upon the refugees who tried to escape the strafing attack. Those refugees not injured in the air attack fled to the surrounding hills, took refuge in a water-filled ditch below the tracks, or ran inside the twin tunnels located below the railroad tracks.

- Seven witnesses testified that the soldiers fired upon the fleeing or hiding refugees.
- A witness (adult) described how the U.S. soldiers shot at refugees who tried to escape over the mountain.
- Another witness (teenager), whom the soldiers fed and evacuated by jeep right after the strafing attack, stated that the soldiers fired upon the refugees who scattered to avoid the air attack.
- An additional witness (teenager) insisted that U.S. soldiers fired at the people hiding in the water-filled ditch.

The U.S. Team has at least five reports of U.S. soldiers treating the wounded immediately following the air attack.

- The first witness (child) remembered some soldiers pulling her from the water-filled ditch after the attack and hugging her.
- The second witness (adult) remembers being wounded in the thigh and that a U.S. soldier applied a pressure dressing to stop the bleeding.

- The third witness (teenager) remembers that the soldiers treated her wound on the railroad tracks.
- The fourth witness (child) remembers he was wounded in the hand and soldiers evacuated him to a hospital.
- The fifth witness (teenager) remembers a soldier helped her by giving her clean clothing from a deserted home after her clothes were covered in blood from a head wound.

Other Korean witnesses indicated that the soldiers helped Korean civilians leave the area of the tunnels.

- The first witness (teenager) said that on the afternoon of July 26, soldiers came to the tunnel and directed the refugees to leave the tunnel and get on a truck. She stated that 11 civilians -- not all of the people in the tunnel -- left the tunnel and went to the truck.
- The second witness (teenager) stated that soldiers helped take two Korean boys away in a jeep from the tunnel area.

These contrasting accounts of how U.S. soldiers behaved (providing aid to refugees and firing on refugees after the strafing) cannot be reconciled. Because only a portion of the Korean witness statements indicate that the soldiers were present after the strafing, the U.S. Review Team cannot say conclusively that the soldiers were present after the strafing.

The common elements in the Korean descriptions of this event are that the refugees were attacked on the railroad tracks by at least two aircraft and an undetermined number of people were injured. Those people who remained uninjured or slightly injured hid in a water-filled ditch below the tracks, took refuge in the twin tunnels, or fled from the scene completely.

#### **K. Fifth Key Event - The move to the twin tunnels and the U.S. soldiers' involvement in this process (July 26).**

The refugees who initially entered the twin tunnels beneath the railroad went there voluntarily to avoid the air attack. Many refugees took refuge in the water-filled ditch at the base of the tracks and near the tunnels' entrance. This ditch was most likely part of a stream that fed into one of the tunnels. In fact, most of the witnesses' statements agree that one of the two tunnels had a stream flowing through it. A witness (teenager) estimated that nearly 300 people already occupied the twin tunnels before those who initially hid elsewhere entered them.

U.S. Review Team does not know, based on a review of the witness statements, if the remaining refugees from outside the tunnel entered the twin tunnels voluntarily or under the soldiers' direction.

- Ten witnesses reported that two or more soldiers approached the refugees after the air attack and directed them to join the others inside the twin tunnels.
- Two witnesses (teenagers) stated that the soldiers forced the refugees into the tunnels at gunpoint by firing their weapons. Less than one-fourth of the witnesses mention this point, so, based on the witness statements, the U.S. Review Team does not know if the remaining refugees entered the twin tunnels with or without guidance from the American soldiers.

The Korean witnesses agree that the refugees who survived the strafing filled the two tunnels so that everyone was packed tightly inside with little or no room to move around. Only those people in the overpass segment with the stream had a water source.

#### **L. Sixth Key Event - The events inside the tunnel and the shooting that occurred (July 26 to July 29).**

Once again, one can derive a general outline of events from the witness statements, which is, according to the Korean statements, that a large number of people died inside the twin tunnels from small-arms fire. Likewise, the duration of the event cannot be conclusively established from the Korean witness statements. Witnesses who were children at the time of the event gave most of the time estimates, and the U.S. Review Team is not confident that their time estimates are accurate.

- Some Korean statements allege that the heaviest firing occurred on the afternoon of the first day, July 26.
- Six witnesses stated that the firing was heaviest on this day.
- Most of the witnesses state, in the active voice, that they knew that U.S. soldiers were firing on them from an unseen location.
- Some witnesses refer to the shooting as it occurred throughout the day (or days).
- Nine witnesses reported that they could observe the American soldiers firing from the mountain across from the mouth of the tunnels.
- A witness (teenager) believed that the shooting came from a distance and was not concentrated on the tunnel.
- A second witness (adult) reported that the soldiers fired on the refugees from the back of the mountain.

Many Korean witness statements allege that machine-gun fire impacted upon, or within, the tunnels while the refugees were inside them. A witness (teenager) stated he could clearly see, from his location inside the tunnel, American soldiers digging in on the mountain and wearing T-shirts. He further stated that the date of his observation was July 27. A handful of other witnesses simply recall seeing U.S. soldiers moving around on the mountain in varying numbers. Once again, the lack of additional statements that mention the U.S.

soldiers on the mountain renders the statements inconclusive on this particular point.

Korean witnesses say that two or more soldiers came to the entrance of the tunnel on what many recall as the first day (July 26).

- Eleven witnesses refer to at least two U.S. soldiers approaching one of the tunnel entrances before or after the first shootings took place.
- A witness (teenager) described how his sister, an elementary schoolteacher who spoke either English or Japanese, conversed with these two Americans. He offers no further details.
- Another witness (teenager) stated that his father, who spoke English, talked with the soldiers and learned that the soldiers believed that there were spies among the refugees. He further described that one soldier said that he, the soldier, could not follow his orders to kill the refugees but would instead select a few of the younger people, charge them as spies, and thereby fulfill his mission.

Multiple Korean statements indicate the observation that some soldiers approached the tunnel entrances on the first day at least to check on the refugees' status.<sup>84</sup> No one can say with any degree of certainty what the soldiers said to the refugees when the soldiers approached the tunnel.

Several witnesses state they had escaped from the tunnels either on the first day or at some point after the first night.

- Seventeen witnesses specifically stated that they escaped alone or with other people.
- Some statements mention that most of the younger men and boys escaped on the first night, leaving only women, children, and the elderly to remain in the double railroad overpass.

Two compelling details common to several statements are the drinking of the blood-saturated water within one of the tunnels and the stacking of bodies at the tunnel entrances to protect those still alive in the back.

- Sixteen Koreans recalled drinking bloody water from the stream that flowed through one of the tunnels. Even more witnesses refer to an insatiable thirst during their time inside the tunnels. The wounded that could not control their desire for water drank from this bloody stream.
- A witness (child) remembers drinking water from a rubber boot.
- Another witness (adult) described how the blood sank to the bottom while the water remained on top.

The other compelling detail that appears in more than one Korean witness statement is that dead bodies were piled at the tunnel entrances.

- At least 11 refugees offered clear details about how they, or their family members, stacked bodies at the entrance of the tunnels to shield and protect those people still alive in the back. The references to the tunnels' rear and front entrances may refer to the downstream and upstream openings of the double overpass.
- A witness, who was ten years old at the time, recalls his older brother and his mother helping to pile the bodies at the tunnel entrance. He also had the misfortune to watch his sister, who was eleven years old, pull the remains of her left eye from its socket.

Nearly all the Korean witnesses explained that they had to remain fully prone in the tunnels at all times to avoid the shooting, which occurred either at night, during the day, four times a day, or in some other pattern. Little consensus exists with regard to the frequency or timing of the shooting, so the transcripts are inconclusive in this regard.

Some witnesses describe events which seem to imply they were there for at least a period of hours or days for example:

- Three witnesses (teenagers) reported that a woman gave birth inside the tunnel.
- Seven Koreans support the assertion that many of the younger men and boys probably left the tunnel on the first night.
- Six other accounts support the assertion listed above by stating that primarily women, children, and the elderly occupied the twin tunnels.

Other Korean statements suggest that the incident in the twin tunnels lasted for a period of four days but provide no details upon which the time estimate was based. Six Koreans who offered dates or the number of days they stayed in the tunnel were 16 years old or younger at the time. The Koreans in this age group probably heard of the dates after the war and applied them to their memories of the events at the twin tunnels. Three Koreans between the ages of 19 and 20 proffer any precise estimate of the length of time spent in the tunnels, but the larger body of statements does not clearly support these estimates.

- A witness (adult) claimed that he spent three nights and four days in the tunnel.
- A second witness (adult) reported that the shooting lasted until July 27.
- A third witness (adult) claimed to have escaped from the tunnel on July 28.
- A fourth person (adult) claimed to have remained in the tunnel for five or six days.
- In summary, the range of days that certain Korean witnesses claim to have spent in the tunnel is as follows: one day: five witnesses; two days:

seven witnesses; three days: three witnesses; and four or more days: five witnesses.

The age of the first three witnesses listed above lends greater weight to their memories, but some confusion with the Koreans' lunar calendar and the United States' version of the calendar seems apparent from some of the statements. Yet many of the Koreans' accounts described at least one night spent in the tunnels. The confusion between calendars, the chaos of the war, and the varying accounts suggest, as a common view, that the refugees may have remained in the tunnel for possibly two days (perhaps from July 26 to 27); four days, or longer, receives little support from the larger group of statements. In effect, the statements do not offer enough specific or corroborative evidence to determine the time allegedly spent in the twin tunnels.

### **M. Revised Composite Sketch of Events**

The previous analysis of the six key events amends our initial composite sketch of events from the Korean perspective. The initial composite sketch represented a simple compilation of the witnesses' statements. The critical analysis of the key events, following our initial composite sketch, indicates that the statements of a very small number of witnesses support some details in the initial compilation, less than 10 of 49. However, the critical analysis highlights common elements that many of the witnesses recall about the key events. The revised composite sketch below follows directly from the analysis:

- On or about July 25, U.S. Army soldiers urged the residents of Im Gae Ri, together with some refugees from Joo Gok Ri and other villages, to move generally south along the Seoul - Pusan road to avoid the danger that the shifting battlefield would bring them.
- Led by the soldiers, the unknown number of refugees trudged south via northeast along the road in the late afternoon.
- After a brief foot march, the U.S. soldiers directed the refugees to a riverbank to spend the night, but no one could sleep because of what seemed like an American artillery battery firing nearby and some sporadic small-arms fire.
- The next morning, July 26, the refugees awoke to find the soldiers gone and the area quiet. The refugees continued on their own, family cows and oxcarts in tow, until they reached Seo Song Won Ri.
- The refugees soon encountered an American roadblock, and the soldiers directed the refugees onto the railroad tracks running parallel to, and above, the road, possibly to relieve some of the traffic congestion.
- Several American soldiers inspected their bags.
- Suddenly, at least two aircraft strafed the refugees with bombs or other explosives and machine-gun fire. Refugees fled in all directions.


- Many refugees took cover in a small, water-filled ditch and in the twin tunnels beneath the railroad tracks. One of the tunnels had a stream running through it.
- Everyone had to remain prone in the crowded underpasses to avoid the bullets that were suddenly fired toward the tunnel's interior from an unknown source. Many more people died from the small-arms fire.
- Two U.S. soldiers approached the tunnel entrance to observe the refugees inside. The soldiers soon departed.
- The weapons firing at the double tunnel continued for an undetermined number of days (but for no longer than four days).
- Most of the refugees who died in the tunnels were killed on the first day (probably July 26). At some point, several of the younger men and children escaped over the mountain in the dark, leaving only women, children, and the elderly to remain in the tunnel.
- A number of refugees were aided by U.S. soldiers and others were evacuated.
- Many of the refugees piled dead bodies in front of the tunnel's entrance to protect those still alive in the back.
- The only water source available was the blood-saturated stream that ran through one of the tunnels.
- The refugees ventured forth from the tunnel once the area fell silent and the weapon's firing stopped.

Several witnesses attempt to quantify the number of dead that resulted from both the strafing and the tunnel shootings. Unfortunately, they use only broad, unsubstantiated estimates that range from 50 to 300 bodies both on the railroad tracks and within the tunnels. The best estimate comes from 27 witnesses who offer some quantifiable numbers. These witnesses mention specific family members or friends whose deaths they witnessed as a result of the strafing attack or the small arms fire within the tunnels. The number totals approximately 70 dead; the wounded are not included in this number. With regard to the recovery of the victims' remains, seven Korean witnesses said that they returned to the tunnel area four to seven days after the incident to recover bodies.<sup>85</sup> These witnesses said they saw some or many dead decomposing bodies in the area and that some bodies had been temporarily buried. One Korean witness reported that refugee bodies from villages other than Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri were not buried until mid August.<sup>86</sup>

In addition to retrieval of the dead after leaving the tunnel, some Korean witnesses mention that they had contact with soldiers of the North Korean People's Army after leaving the tunnel.<sup>87</sup> One witness indicated that NKPA soldiers stayed in the mountains near her village (Im Gae Ri) and actually came into the village to eat.<sup>88</sup>




## N. The Interview Process




O. Interview Organization Charts

Interview Organization Chart




## Interview Organization Chart




Interview Organization Chart



Interview Organization Chart



## Interview Organization Chart



## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Some statements are summaries, some statements are a mix of summaries and questions and answers and some are questions and answers.

<sup>2</sup> Gianelli, Paul C. and Imwinkelreid, Edward J., Scientific Evidence, 3d Edition, LEXIS, 1999, p. 429.

<sup>3</sup> Further, extreme stress or terror during an incident degrades a person's ability to remember an entire sequence of events in detail. After a traumatic event, some individuals may develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Most psychologists believe that PTSD may systematically distort memories of those affected. The U.S. Review Team believed that PTSD might have affected the memories of U.S. and Korean witnesses. OEMA discussed this affect with the team. See note 4 below.

<sup>4</sup> Briefing by Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA), Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy at Arlington, VA for the U.S. Review Team on August 30, 2000 and consultations with the team in August and September 2000. U.S. Team consultation with a Forensic Psychologist assigned to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service in September 2000.

<sup>5</sup> The U.S. Review Team discussed distortion and contamination of memory with OEMA and the forensic psychologist mentioned in note 4.

<sup>6</sup> For example, interview with USAF veteran.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. veteran interviews (1 noncommissioned officer, 1 officer and 2 soldiers).

<sup>8</sup> U. S. veteran interviews (2 noncommissioned officers and 2 soldiers).

<sup>9</sup> U.S. veteran interviews (2 noncommissioned officers and 1 soldier).

<sup>10</sup> One meeting that occurred in November 1997, see National Council of Churches Letter to President Clinton dated April 22, 1998 and enclosures. In a November 3, 2000 ROK and US Team Working Group meeting, the members of the ROK Review Team mentioned that the "survivors" group held two demonstrations recently in Seoul.

<sup>11</sup> One such meeting occurred in South Korea in November 1999 in conjunction with the filming of the NBC Dateline report on No Gun Ri, which ran on December 28, 1999.

<sup>12</sup> For example a documentary novel was published in Korea about the experiences of the "survivors", Jung Eun Yong, Friend, Do you know our sufferings? The book was discussed during the television documentary in note 14 below.

<sup>13</sup> For example in November 1997 as indicated in a National Council of Churches Letter to President Clinton dated April 22, 1998.

<sup>14</sup> For example television documentary "Testimony in 47 years" broadcast by MBC-TV in Korea on November 2, 1997, cited in report attached to the letter to President Clinton noted above.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. interviews (2 officers, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 3 soldiers).

<sup>17</sup> Discussions with OEMA see note 4.

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- <sup>18</sup> Discussions with OEMA and forensic psychologist. See note 4.
- <sup>19</sup> Discussions with OEMA. See note 4.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> 19 Korean witnesses out of the 49 witnesses whose statements the US Team analyzed.
- <sup>23</sup> See note 4 OEMA briefings.
- <sup>24</sup> Diagram (Interview Process) at the end of Chapter 4.
- <sup>25</sup> U.S. interviews (1 noncommissioned officer and 2 soldiers).
- <sup>26</sup> U.S. interviews (2 noncommissioned officers and 1 soldier).
- <sup>27</sup> U.S. interviews with 3 soldiers.
- <sup>28</sup> U.S. interviews with 3 soldiers.
- <sup>29</sup> U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer.
- <sup>30</sup> U.S. interviews with 5 pilots.
- <sup>31</sup> The pilots used the word civilian in their interviews.
- <sup>32</sup> Nine pilots who flew missions according to mission reports.
- <sup>33</sup> U.S. interviews with Daily, April 4-5, 2000, July 10, 2000.
- <sup>34</sup> U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer. When first interviewed, many veterans (2 officers, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 3 soldiers) believed that Mr., Daily had been with them in Korea. One veteran (noncommissioned officer thought that he heard Mr. Daily's name called during a mail call in Korea. When re-interviewed in June 2000, they were unable to recall specific instances when they saw Mr. Daily in Korea but believed at first that he had been there because of his attendance and behavior at reunions and conversations at reunions. These veterans, upon further reflection, did not actually remember seeing Mr. Daily in Korea or Japan.
- <sup>35</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.
- <sup>36</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.
- <sup>37</sup> Veterans used the words culvert and tunnel and double tunnel interchangeably. In the interviews if it was clear from the context what feature the veteran was talking about, we did not ask additional questions. In an interview if it was not clear which feature the veteran was talking about, interviewers attempted to clarify with additional questions or in some cases a re-interview. In the end, some interviews were not clear and these interviews have been interpreted to the best of the U.S. Teams' ability,
- <sup>38</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.



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<sup>39</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>40</sup> Interviews with Simmons, May 26, 2000; Interviews with Becker, March 23, 2000; Interviews with Desfor, May 19, 2000; McDonald, March 24, 2000; Interview with Warner, March 29, 2000.

<sup>41</sup> See for example John Osborne, "Report from the Orient: Guns are not enough", Life, Vol. 29, No. 8, August 21, 1950.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. interviews with officer.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. interview with officer.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. interviews (2 officers and 1 soldier).

<sup>45</sup> U.S. interviews (2 officers).

<sup>46</sup> U.S. interview with officer.

<sup>47</sup> U.S. interviews (2 soldiers).

<sup>48</sup> U.S. interviews (1 noncommissioned officer and 1 soldier).

<sup>49</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

<sup>50</sup> Chapter 3, p. 88 - 89.

<sup>51</sup> U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer.

<sup>52</sup> U.S. interviews (1 officer and 2 noncommissioned officers).

<sup>53</sup> U.S. interviews (1 noncommissioned officer and 1 soldier).

<sup>54</sup> U.S. interviews (2 noncommissioned officers)

<sup>55</sup> U.S. interviews (1 officer and 1 noncommissioned officer).

<sup>56</sup> U.S. interview with officer.

<sup>57</sup> U.S. interview with noncommissioned officer.

<sup>58</sup> U.S. interview with officer.

<sup>59</sup> U.S. interview with officer.

<sup>60</sup> U.S. interviews (2 noncommissioned officers).

<sup>61</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

<sup>62</sup> U.S. interviews with 2 soldiers.

<sup>63</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

<sup>64</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

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<sup>65</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

<sup>66</sup> U.S. interview with soldier.

<sup>67</sup> Some F-80 pilots recall using bombs early in the war, but while based in Japan F-80s were not armed with bombs. Heavy ordnance would limit the range of the aircraft such that they could not reach their targets in Korea then return to Japan.

<sup>68</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>69</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>70</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>71</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>73</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>74</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. interview with pilot.

<sup>76</sup> U.S. interview with officer.

<sup>77</sup> Journalists interviewed Korean and American witnesses. See for example notes 11 and 14 in the introduction to this chapter.

<sup>78</sup> Sang-Hun Choe and Charles S. Hanley, "Ex-GIs Tell AP of Korea Killings," September 30, 1999, Associated Press reprinted at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/19990930>.

<sup>79</sup> Chun Chon-ja provided a witness statement that the U.S. Review Team reviewed.

<sup>80</sup> Park Hee-sok provided a witness statement that the U.S. Review Team reviewed.

<sup>81</sup> Soldiers could not communicate directly with aircraft as the Koreans believed. See Chapter 3.

<sup>82</sup> Despite the witnesses' beliefs, U.S. soldiers could not communicate with aircraft. The soldiers did not have access to the radio frequencies used by the aircraft. See Chapter 3, Combat Operations in July 1950.

<sup>83</sup> The air attack was not called for by the soldiers on the ground, despite the refugees' belief that it was. See Chapter 3, Combat Operations in July 1950.

<sup>84</sup> One U.S. witness did go down to the tunnel entrance and saw U.S. personnel in the tunnel

<sup>85</sup> Korean witness statements summarized in ROK "On-Site Technical Investigation" provided to the U.S. Review Team in August 2000.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Three Korean witness statements (adult, child, and a third witness whose age was not provided). The ROK Review Team took five Korean witness statements in April 2000 and

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provided them to the U.S. Review Team in November 2000. One of these witnesses gave short statement in an earlier interview. The four new witness statements and the additional longer witness statement taken in April 2000 are not included in the 76 witness statements that U.S. Review Team had received earlier which are discussed in this chapter.

<sup>88</sup> Korean witness statement (child).